Abstract
Chinese official documents often treat India with a certain degree of disdain, as a secondary player. However, beyond the occasional tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that separates the two countries, the interests of both powers have become increasingly intertwined in recent years. The Indo-Pacific—or, more specifically, the Indian Ocean and its access routes—has gained prominence in the policies of New Delhi and Beijing. Projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the so-called String of Pearls, or the construction of certain major infrastructure projects are testing the limits of both nations’ control over commercial and strategic traffic and transit on the continent (Gómez-de-Ágreda, Á., Feijóo González, C., 2023). Interestingly, despite sharing a long land border, both countries seem destined to shift much of their disputes to the maritime sphere.
The article focuses on trans-Himalayan relations and the perspectives from both sides of the mountain range. It is a complex landscape in which India’s policy of multi-alignment introduces numerous nuances into relations between two countries that have often insisted on turning their backs on one another. The strategic autonomy promoted by Modi is heavily influenced by minilateral alliances—especially the QUAD—which link them to interests in containing China.
