Afghanistan: the `failed state´ as status quo?

GESI Analysis, 1/2012

Since the breakdown of the bipolar system, there has been a renewed interest in so-called failed states. Initially, this interest could be attributed to a post–Cold War enthusiasm for addressing outstanding issues hitherto blocked by the stand-off between superpowers.

After 9/11, the focus shifted to failed states that could potentially harbour a new type of asymmetric threat that has proliferated in the form of insurgencies and terrorism. Afghanistan is an example of such a failed state. Ten years after 9/11 and the start of the conflict on its territory, the security and political situation in Afghanistan remains unstable and the Islamist insurgency continues to represent the principal threat. The 10th anniversary of 9/11 presents an appropriate moment to review the reasons why Afghanistan is considered to be a failed state, the challenges faced by the international community and the Afghan authorities in the short to medium term and, more importantly, the issues that should be addressed if Afghanistan is to shed its label as a ‘failed state’.

 

Introduction

After the Cold War, the sudden lack of support from one of the two superpowers for many governments around the world plunged numerous countries into ferocious and protracted civil wars. Several governments proved incapable of confronting these new threats and challenges effectively, leading to a violent series of coups d’état or dangerous power vacuums. These took place mainly in developing regions, where the concept of sovereignty was a vague notion and real political authority was absent. The result was the emergence of areas of instability and the proliferation of so-called failed states (Vázquez del Pino, García Guindo and Peña Ramos 2009).

The international conflicts that characterised the fall of the bipolar balance of power, exemplified by intra-state, ethno-cultural disputes, prompted the international community to take an interest in these failed states which became an issue of moral altruism. This altruism was manifested in enthusiastic United Nations missions to address long-term `pending tray´ problems—states such as Western Sahara, Somalia and Cambodia—with varying results.

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the Western perception of how to deal with failed states shifted from peacekeeping and/or peacemaking and humanitarian operations to addressing the multitude of problems that made failed states security threats.

 

The case of Afghanistan

Following the definition proposed by the Washington-based Fund for Peace, a failed state is one in which the government cannot physically control its territory; that has only a limited monopoly, or none at all, on the legitimate use of force; is unable to provide basic public services; and cannot represent the whole country in the international community (Fund for Peace 2011).

Observing the situation in Afghanistan at present, it is not difficult to identify the reasons why Afghanistan ranks seventh in the Fund for Peace’s annual Failed States Index of 177 countries, published by the Foreign Policy journal (Foreign Policy Magazine 2011). Among those reasons are the Afghan central government’s lack of legitimacy; the incompetence shown by many of the country’s public institutions; pervasive corruption; illegal narcotics trafficking; long-standing and well-documented inter-ethnic tensions; a disputed third-party-imposed border (the Durand Line); the absence of public support for the government; and the persistent threat of violence posed by insurgents.

The unstable nature of the political system, clearly evident to the international community, is also reflected in the Afghan population’s own perception of its politicians and political institutions, which are often considered as ‘puppets’ of foreign powers. After the discredited December 2009 presidential elections and September 2010 parliamentary elections—in which security and fraud were major concerns—the lack of legitimacy of the Afghan central government (whose authority barely extends outside its offices in Kabul) was fully exposed both within and beyond the country’s borders.

The Afghan government (which survives largely on foreign direct investment and international aid) is often constrained by pressures from donors and plays a secondary role in decision-making processes. Thus, the demands of the Afghan population are not always taken into account, giving rise to social divisions and a perception of discrimination and exclusion in certain parts of Afghan society.

In addition, public institutions must rely on an almost non-existent operational capability. Government employees in charge of assigning resources and administering international aid in many cases suffer from inadequate training, and personal interests often prevail over professionalism.

A perfect storm of distrust created by complex ethnic differences, borders that fail to reflect the complex realities on the ground, social inequalities and widespread corruption is exacerbated by the climate of insecurity fostered by the Taliban insurgency. The insurgency in Afghanistan does not correspond to the classic definition of revolutionary war, since the main objective of the fighters involved is not just to obtain a certain share of power in order to eventually overthrow the established government. The principal ambition of the Afghan insurgency is to perpetuate a failed state where they can operate in so-called safe havens with impunity. As noted above, the government’s ability to secure a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a country’s borders—through instruments such as the police and the army—is an essential requirement for a state to be considered functional.

All these factors contribute to an explanation of why Afghanistan should largely be considered a failed state. Whether Afghanistan’s status quo equates to the criteria of a failed state remains to be seen; whether authorities in Afghanistan and among the international community are ready to recognise this also remains to be seen.

 

A failed state or a failure of expectations?

Since the Bonn Agreement in December 2001 and agreements reached at the subsequent International Conferences on Afghanistan—with the leitmotiv of improving the situation in Afghanistan—efforts to help the country seek a better future for its citizens have slowly borne fruit. Measures taken have been translated into tangible improvements in the quality of life for a not irrelevant percentage of the Afghan population. And the energy and resources invested on the ground have undoubtedly facilitated a more secure environment. Nevertheless, the facts enumerated above that qualify Afghanistan as a failed state have multiple and multifaceted consequences, and the challenges faced by Afghan authorities and the international community in addressing them have been equally complex.

The good intentions of participants in this long-term project of Afghan reconstruction have repeatedly clashed with reality. On many occasions, measures taken have suffered from a lack of focus on medium to long-term expectations, with the result that improvements are undercut by significant limitations. Throughout the last decade, such short-sightedness has ranged from an incorrect identification of actors, and their limited vision in the decision-making process and strategy implementation, to a lack of sufficiently deep knowledge of the country, its culture and idiosyncrasies.

In order to make a functional state out of Afghanistan, the ultimate goal for both the Afghan authorities and the international community should be to establish a stable national government that can guarantee its own security and that of its citizens against internal and external threats. In order to achieve this expectation, however, both actors will have to face an important series of challenges.

 

Challenges to be overcome

If, after a short war, it had become clear that no political stability could be reached without a minimal and indispensable amount of guaranteed security, now, 10 years later, the situation has changed beyond question. At the present time, in order to guarantee security and confront safe havens and the insurgency, governance reform is equally necessary.

Since Afghanistan is a political as well as a military campaign, the international community and the Afghan authorities should pay special attention to developing a durable strategic concept at the national and regional levels rather than putting all their efforts in operational tactics (Carlton-Smith 2008). The battle today has to be fought not just against insurgency and terrorism but against inefficiency and corruption as well.

 

Combating insurgency

As previously mentioned, the insurgency in Afghanistan seeks to establish a failed state in which safe havens allow the insurgents to manoeuvre with total impunity. The insurgents try to accomplish this by taking advantage of porous borders, transnational dynamics and timing. This kind of insurgency, which is flexible, globalised and decentralised in nature, has forced the Coalition forces as well the Afghan security forces to revise and adapt counter-insurgency methods (COIN).

An insurgency of this nature obliges all actors involved in COIN efforts to constantly refine their methods, placing expectations on them that are difficult to fulfil. The willingness of coalition governments to make a long-term commitment to the Afghan conflict often clashes with growing public disaffection in Western societies, which do not always understand the economic and human costs or the ethics behind such a `far-away war´.

As Ralph Peters (2006) would say, defeating insurgencies takes time and there is no quick or easy formula for suppressing them.

There is no way of developing valuable counter-insurgency policies that require a long-term vision without the public support of the societies backing and financing them. To invoke the well-worn British slogan `winning hearts and minds´, the governments involved in the Afghan campaign should try to win not only the hearts and minds of the Afghan population but also those of their own domestic populations back home. Taking into account the natural disposition of post-heroic societies to retreat from a `war of exhaustion´, it is worth reflecting on what the German political theorist Herfried Münckler has described as ‘the problem of what society is willing to sacrifice in order to assert itself and its values’ (Bessing 2006/2007).

 

Combating inefficiencies and corruption

A consensus exists with regard to the major reversals the Taliban suffered in recent years. As well, it is accepted that the new build-up in Afghanistan must now also focus on political, economical and social reforms. Nevertheless, these kinds of reforms are far from easy to achieve. In order to make progress, a compromise between the allies and the Afghan central government on the one hand and the local authorities on the other is essential. However, that relationship of understanding and collaboration is likely to be fragile. In some cases, such reforms could be perceived by local powers as a greater threat than the insurgency itself. Political reforms could be interpreted as an attempt to reduce their share of power; economic reforms could be seen as an effort to diminish the traditional, corrupt practices on which their livelihood depends; and last but not least, social reforms, such as the implementation of anti-discriminatory policies, could threaten customary tribal, family and even male monopolies on leadership.

A further complication in this inclusive vision of Afghan development is the unavoidable necessity of negotiations with the Taliban. In 2010, President Karzai gained international and domestic support to initiate peace talks in the framework of a reconciliation process with the Taliban Senior Leadership (TBSL). This resulted in the establishment of the High Peace Council (HPC), led by Burhanuddin Rabbani. Following the assassination of Rabbani on 20 September 2011, the prospect of peace talks, and a potential legal and political role in the Afghan government for former Taliban who have renounced their links terrorism, look unattainable.

In a statement published on the Voice of Jihad website on 28 August 2011, Taliban leader Mullah Omar posted a message to mark Eid ul-Fitr (the end of Ramadan). In the message, he congratulated the mujahedin for their `continuous victories´ in Afghanistan, and spoke of the immediate withdrawal of all forces and the establishment of an Islamic regime as the single solution for Afghanistan. In particular, however, he criticised the Bonn International Conference on Afghanistan in December 2011, rejecting any possibility of peace talks (Flashpoint Partners 2011).

In addition, the Taliban are able to exploit the central and local authorities’ lack of legitimacy, inefficiencies and perceived corruption by engaging with tribal structures in restoring order in a closer and more compromised way than the Afghan government would be able to do. This reality brings with it the risk of part of the Afghan population being willing to accept the return of the Taliban regime.

 

Changing Afghanistan’s ‘failed state’ label

During the London International Conference on Afghanistan in January 2010 (NATO–ISAF 2010a), a commitment was made between the Afghan government and the international community. The key tenets of the agreement, as set out in the conference communiqué, were

• The maintenance of a long-term pledge to Afghanistan that could be prolonged for the next 15 years;
• The support of the development of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP);
• The honourable integration into society of those willing to renounce violence and respect the principles of the Afghan constitution;
• The development of an economic strategy involving increased progress on agriculture, human resources and infrastructure;
• And, the strengthening of Afghan financial management systems.

Implementing these goals has not been a simple task for any of the 70 countries involved in Afghanistan at the time. Nevertheless, there are some measures that could have help and could still help fulfill them.

Reinforcing the legitimacy of the Afghan government is one such measure. This should be done both at the internal and external level. It is necessary to build up the belief that the

Afghan government is a better option than the Taliban. Improving employment conditions, boosting the economy and implementing more effective social policies to reduce inequalities would represent a good start.

The legitimacy of the central government is closely tied to the role played by local authorities. Local authorities have always had a tendency to be closer to the needs, perceptions, traditions and customs of the Afghan population. Recognising the needs of the population and extending democratic means to include actors who could provide ideas to meet those needs is vital. This aim could be met by promoting a feeling of local ownership as part of a sustainable Afghanistan. Encouraging local institutions to become gradually responsible for the security, governance and development of their own regions would also help. This could be achieved by enforcing mechanisms that oblige the government to take economic, political and social measures even if these measures sometimes conflict with the personal interests of government members.

As acknowledged in the communiqué of the Kabul International Conference held in July 2010 (NATO–ISAF 2010b), transition is a conditions-based process, not a calendar-driven event. This process should not mean the complete withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from the ground in the near future, but a gradual shift to a supporting role as Afghan National Security Force capabilities develop. A successful transition involving the handing over of responsibility for security to the central government and the local authorities will require the Afghan National Security Forces to be prepared to track both existing and new security challenges (NATO–ISAF 2010c). Obviously, this should be completed by persuading repentant insurgents and moderate Taliban to play a role in those institutions, as long as they respect Afghan laws and principles enshrined in the Afghan constitution, regardless of the difficulties that tracking the real success of this strategy might imply.

Despite Mullah Omar’s speeches, the TBSL intends to prevent moderate Taliban from joining the reintegration program, and despite the frustrations expressed by President Karzai in the statement he issued on 1 October 2011 (CNN 2011), the strategy of seeking peace talks with the Taliban should not be abandoned. Nor should one underestimate either the potential effectiveness of the cooperation and support of Afghanistan’s nearest neighbours, especially India and Pakistan. Good relations with the government of Pakistan are essential to maintain stability in the region.

It is also important to realise to what extent the mass media can play a role in international conflicts. The international community and the Afghan authorities therefore need to consider how the media affect public opinion and its knowledge about the world, helping to constitute the public sphere of society. Wise foreign policy choices should rest upon a foundation of citizen knowledge of often-intractable conflicts in order to obtain public support for long-term interventions.

These challenges and new ones were addressed during the International Conference on Afghanistan hosted in Bonn in December 2011 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2012). Built on November 2011 Istanbul Conference, the Bonn Conference brought together over one hundred international delegations and one thousand participants. In this occasion the key tenets of the agreement, as set out in the Conference conclusions, were:

- Regarding governance: the Afghan Government reaffirmed their commitment to a stable, democratic society, free of the scourge corruption and in which the rights of all citizens will be protected. This included strengthening their institutions and the rule of law, and ensuring a fully transparent electoral process. On the other side, the international community emphasized the need for a transition to a support role, focused on building Afghan capacity and sovereign authority.

• On the subject of security: the international community committed to continue supporting the training, equipping, financing and capacity development of the Afghan national security forces through 2014 and beyond.
• Concerning economic and social developments: the Afghan government committed to strengthening its public financial management systems, and improving infrastructure and trade connectivity and conditions for private and international investment.
• To conclude, the Conference reaffirmed that stability and prosperity in Afghanistan depends on stability and prosperity in the region, and encouraged strong, sustainable cooperation to this end.

Following on from Bonn, the upcoming 2012 Chicago and Tokyo conferences will set out the international community’s firm commitments in the areas of governance, security, the peace process, economic and social development and regional cooperation.

Nevertheless, the real challenge will be to translate the goals agreed upon by all actors involved in Afghanistan into measures capable of having a significant impact on the reality on the ground.

 

Conclusion

As of April 2012, Afghanistan can still be considered a failed state. The prospects for stability in the country are uncertain. The situation is constantly evolving. The government does not exercise widespread control across the country. The risk that part of the Afghan population will accept the return of the Taliban regime is a real one. In short, the complexities of reality often overtake the goals and strategies carefully designed to help Afghanistan grow into a functional state.

After a decade of war in Afghanistan, it has been proven that the stability of Afghanistan is not going to be achieved only by military means but by a combination of governance, rule of law, and economic, social and security measures. However, it is important not to deny the achievements made during the past 10 years, about which a cautious optimism should remain. That is why the international community and Afghan government should try to find an honest way to make clear to their audiences not only the challenges and compromises the future might present but also the results that can be reached.

A balance, then, must be found between the need to inform public opinion in a comprehensive way and the need to manage `war fatigue´ in many Western societies. This balance should be found by explaining the need for international intervention in long conflicts and the economic and human costs it implies, while reassuring the Afghan population and its representatives of the international community’s willingness to continue its involvement. The role of the mass media in realising this task will be undeniable and very powerful.

Only then might the international community be inclined to change Afghanistan's 'failed state' label.

 

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Editado por: Grupo de Estudios en Seguridad Internacional (GESI). Lugar de edición: Granada (España). ISSN: 2340-8421.

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